1.130 Recommendation. With regard to the responsibility of international environmental agreements, responsible federal authorities or authorities should clearly specify and document the environmental results they expect; How they will measure and communicate the results and how they will evaluate and verify the results in order to improve performance. In Figure 3, we represent the number of environmental contracts for the various thematic areas and the number of contracts with at least health care. We find that, in absolute terms, health provisions are more common in environmental contracts related to agriculture and pollution. It is likely that the health provisions will not be included in fisheries or freshwater environmental contracts, even though both themes clearly have an impact on health. 1.42 Reducing the effects of ozone-depleting substances. Environment Canada also receives information from international sources on the various environmental aspects and the effects of reducing the use of ozone-depleting substances. The scientific information comes from the reports of the Montreal Protocol Scientific Assessment Group. This body is made up of international experts from countries, including Canada, who are parties to the Montreal Protocol. These reports are used by the parties as a basis for decision.- According to these reports: Go to the data at the end of this page for snapshots on environmental agreements, CO2 emissions and renewable energy by country. 1.127 In all cases, with the exception of the MARPOL Agreement, the responsible services indicated that they were conducting periodic performance checks to assess environmental outcomes on the basis of expected results.

However, none of the departments had clear documentation of the findings of these audits. Recently, an economic literature has argued that international environmental agreements (IEAs) cannot have a real impact because of their voluntary and self-binding nature. This literature concludes that the terms of the IEA are the codification of the uncooperative balance, and recent empirical work has supported this conclusion within the framework of the Montreal Protocol. This document results in the opposite result by comparing CFC issues that are implicit in cooperative and non-cooperative management channels. The cooperative path is implicit in the Montreal protocol. The non-cooperative pathway is implicit in countries` behaviour during the unilateral management of CFC emissions. This study assesses the relationship between countries` trends in producing CFCs and per capita income during the 1976-88 period (before the Montreal Protocol came into force). It then extrapolates this unilateral management route beyond 1988 and compares it to the commitments made under the cooperative regime. This comparison between the projected non-cooperative path and the commitments of the Montreal Protocol allows qualitative testing of theories on the economic basis of the IEA. We find that without the protocol, the production of CFCs (and therefore emissions) would have tripled over the next 50 years. This study also complements analyses of existing environmental-kuznet curves by providing unilateral management estimates of global externality. In this way, we will be able to assess the impact of the distribution of the protocol in addition to its effectiveness.